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Experts serve an important role in the evaluation of mothers and in the 
incorporation of motherhood ideology into case law. I conclude elsewhere 
(Miller, 1997) that experts provide judges with a perceived objective interpre- 
tation of mothers that is subjectively grounded in the motherhood myths of 
maternal instinct, maternal self-sacrifice and maternal fulfillment (Schwartz, 
1993: 51). These expert judgments then serve as part of the justification for 
judicial decision-making. Yet how are experts granted their expertise? Upon 
what criteria is expertise valued by the courts? In this paper I focus on one aspect 
of these larger questions: perceptions about court experts and expertise con- 
tained in judicial discourse. Specifically, I discuss perceptions of non-mother 
experts as hard-working and blameless, as the "true" child advocates in the 
system, and as accurate predictors of the future of mothers and their children. 
I argue that collectively these perceptions about court experts held by judicial 
actors contribute to the devaluation of the experiences and perceptions of 
mothers in family law decisions. 
Evaluations and sanctions of mothers have recently entered a more 
politicized public debate. As John Meyer and his colleagues argue, "mother- 
child conflicts thatwere once the substance of folklore and common gossip have 
become items for public discussion and political regulation.. ." (1988: 138). 
Experts have played a central role in this discussion and regulation. For 
instance, both experts and the court evaluate mothers and make decisions 
within family law using the criterion of "best interests of the child." This legally 
mandated standpoint perspective withdraws expertise from individual mothers 
and places it in the hands ofthe child advocates in the system. Further, scientific 
expertise has been brought to bear to define relevant terms and to provide 
advice, criticism, and support in such areas as breastfeeding (Wall, 2001: 604), 
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balancing work and motherhood (Garey, 1999: 11) and general mothering 
practices (Hays, 1996: 51-70). 
T o  this end, the establishment of courtroom expertise and perceptions 
about experts themselves should be considered, as it is through the guise of 
claimed expertise that mothers find their behaviors evaluated and punished. T o  
help in this discussion, I present examples of United States case law derived 
from a larger study of judicial evaluations of motherhood. The larger study 
contains 311 United States family law cases decided between 1980 and 2001 
generated from the Lexis/Nexis database system. I begin my analysis by 
presenting information on the role of experts and the expertise of mothers and 
judges in United States family law. 
The role of experts 
Professional expertise has been incorporated into judicial decision-making 
and has been used to justify intervention into the private realm of motherhood. 
As I n  re KaiIer articulates: 
Under the law of the land the welfare and best interests of children are 
primarily the concern of their parents, and it is only when parents are 
unfit to have the custody, rearing and education of children, that the 
state asparenspah-iae, with its courts and judges, steps in to find fitting 
custodians in locoparentium. 
The legal presumption is that motherhood is a private act, and remains 
necessarily so unless there is some compelling state interest that requires 
intervention. Identification of a compelling state interest, however, may 
require an invasion of the domain of privacy to assess the need for a more 
substantial intervention by the court. That initial intrusion, which later 
justifies court-ordered intervention andlor response, is frequently performed 
by experts. 
The role of experts in judicial decision-making should not be underesti- 
mated. Although judges retain final decision-making authority, experts define 
good mothering, mediate conflicting reports on mothering activities, and 
provide ongoing assessments of mothers' attempts at improvement. Experts 
also serve as a primary source of information and evaluation about the interests 
and needs of children. The role of experts, then, may be fluid and ambiguous, 
while their testimony may be influential to the court. 
Expertise is presumed to be held by a limited number of individuals who 
have received specialized training in fields related to the case. Medical per- 
sonnel (Champagne, 1992: 6), psychiatric experts (Mosoff, 1995: 110), and 
social workers (Gothard, 1989: 65) dominate both in their use as expert 
witnesses and in their status as legally-defined experts. As Michael King 
describes, the role of 'The Expert" ". . . allows a privileged status, a mantle of 
reliability, to be extended to professionals who are not members of the legal 
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fraternity" (1991: 313). For a judge to accept the expert testimony of an 
individual, helshe must be satisfied with the qualifications of the expert and 
the integrity, credibility and neutrality of the testimony itself. To  a certain 
extent, then, a court's evaluation of experts forces them to act like experts 
themselves. 
The discourse of expertise reflects several distinct issues. First, scientific 
experts utilize a discourse of contingency as opposed to a discourse of truth 
gasanoff, 1993: 77). For instance, researchers often note the limitations of their 
methodology. These caveats serve as indicators ofthevalidity and generalizability 
of the research. Such empirical contingencies are expected within scientific 
communities but in the courtroom they become problematic. King (1991: 314) 
argues that "subject[ing] one form of truth to the truth-validating procedures 
of another necessarily results in distortion ..." 
Second, competing discourses force legal personnel and researchers to 
both modify their language. Accordingly, researchers have found that experts, 
attorneys, judges and juries all agreed that one of the most important criteria 
in identifying "good experts was their ability to translate technical information 
to the court (Champagne, 1992: 10). Yet, ultimately, judges must construct 
their own conceptualizations of expertise. As Sheila Jasanoff says: "the ultimate 
goal of the courts is the attainable one of dispensing justice, not the impossible 
one of finding objective truth" (1993: 80). 
Judges as experts 
As the dissenting judge noted in I n  the Interest ofAngela Dee Holt, judges 
hold an "awesome, Godlike" responsibility. Yet in making decisions, courts 
sometimes go beyond the mantle of expertise granted to them by their position. 
For instance, in deciding the financial divisions following a divorce, the court 
in Granbey v. Carleton assumed personal expert status by claiming his experi- 
ence as a parent and an artist made him uniquely qualified to understand the 
parenting needs of an artistic and intelligent child. In doing so, the judge 
justified his criticism of the mother, despite the fact that custody had already 
been decided and the criticism was irrelevant to the case. 
The expertise ofjudges usually, however, rests with the position they hold. 
In Anonymous v. Anonymous the court was asked to decide the best interests of 
a mentally retarded minor whose parents were seeking permission to have 
sterilized. The trial court did not find either the testimony of the family 
physician or the arguments of the parents compelling. Taking full responsibil- 
ity and expertise upon themselves alone, the appellate court judges noted: 
Ultimately, it is the duty of the court, and not the parents, to 
determine the need for sterilization.. . . While the parents' duty of 
custody, care and nurture gives rise to their right to advise a child and 
participate in any decision, a decision relating to reproductive anatomy 
belongs to the child.. . . 
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In claiming the authority to make the decision on behalf of the child, the 
- 
court also assumed the expertise to appreciate her condition, her limitations, 
and her future. Without years of experience with the child, how is it that the 
judges' review of legal doctrine and interpretation of "best interests" becomes 
more important in a life-altering decision than the parents who raised the 
child? 
Mothers as experts 
Within the courtroom, the privileges affiliated with the expert role are 
associated with the ability of the person, so endowed, to state her/his opinion 
about the issues at hand. Others, identified by King (1991: 314) as "non- 
experts," are required to provide only "factual" testimony. Mothers are rarely 
granted expert status; instead, they "may describe how the child has been 
behaving, but they are not allowed to give any opinion as to why the child 
behaves as she or he does or whatwill be the best way of dealing with the child's 
behavior" (King 1991: 314). In short, a mother's expertise may be constrained 
to the role of witness. 
In Brooks v. Hitch, both parents were seeking custody of their five year old 
daughter. This meant that the court was faced with competing interpretations 
of the child's behavior and daims about which parent could better address the 
behavior. The mother argued that her daughter's encopresis was best cured 
with time and love and that her temper tantrums would decrease as she gained 
stability in her life. The mental health experts and the father disagreed. 
Vilifying the mother's close relationship with the child to the point of 
"smothering," and criticizing the mother for her failure to complete a question- 
naire on parenting as part of his evaluation, one expert defined both the child's 
problems and their source- inappropriate mothering. Building their decision 
upon this expert's opinion, the court granted custody to the father, soundly 
chastising the mother in the process: "Perhaps the most difficult aspect of this 
case is that it is Mother's attachment to her daughter-which comes close to 
a dependency-this is most destructive to this child.. . ." 
In another example, in 1979 a 19-year-old unmarried woman with an I Q  
of 73 gave birth (In the Matter $Martin E. Borst, Jr.). She asked her caseworker 
to arrange for adoption of the child. The caseworker refused, concluding that 
the mother "could manage the role of motherhood with guidance." Two years 
later, the same social service agency sought to terminate the mother's parental 
rights in the child (with whom she had by then developed a relationship), 
testifying that "there is some question whether she is mentally capable of. .. 
planning" for her child's future. After initially requiring the mother to be a 
mother despite her wishes to the contrary (an endorsement of the myths of 
motherhood), the agency then claimed that the mother was not fulfilling her 
obligations toward her child. The court acknowledged the mother's failures as 
described by the experts, but postponed termination ofparental rights. In doing 
so, the judge initiated a process for the experts to gather more evidence about 
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the mother's failings. Instead of rejecting the experts' judgment (both in terms 
ofthe adoption and parental termination), the decision reinforced the expertise 
of the agency by granting them the obligation to further evaluate the mother's 
behaviors. 
Perceptions of experts 
I discuss below three perceptions endorsed by courts related to experts and 
expertise: 1) that experts are hard-working and blameless for the failures oftheir 
clients; 2) that experts are the "true" child advocates in the system and, as such, 
are a better source of information about the "best interests" of children; and 3) 
that experts are able to accurately predict the future for mothers. Each ofthese 
perceptions serves to remove expertise from mothers. 
Perception I: experts as hard-working and blameless 
Sometimes, defining the qualities of mothering means confirming the 
quality of the experts involved in their case. In Brandv. Alabama Department 
ofPensions andsecurity, the courts concluded that the social services department 
had done everything they could to encourage the mother's relationship with her 
child, from whom she had recently had her parental rights terminated. Despite 
efforts by agency staff to schedule visitation between mother and child, the 
court noted that it was the mother's own history of drug use, prostitution and 
other inappropriate choices that led to the termination of parental rights. 
Similarly, the court-ordered friend in In re Adoption 0fKF.H. and KRH. 
testified that she had been "frustrated many times while attempting to 
coordinate visitation between the non-custodial mother and her infant twins. 
The court concluded that despite the best efforts of the court-ordered friend, 
the mother failed to have any contact with the children for over a year, hence 
justifjmg their adoption by the custodial father's wife. While the court 
acknowledged the mother's difficulty in maintaining contact with pre-verbal 
infants when they lived out of state, they discounted the mother's claim that the 
distance and age ofthe children made a mediated relationship with her children 
a necessity. 
What these cases signify is the reluctance of the court to blame experts 
involved in the evaluation of mothers. Rarely did a majority court remark on 
inappropriate or less than superior actions on the part of experts. Occasionally, 
a dissenting judge would ironically point out that, as did the judge in In the 
Interest of Angela Dee Holt: 
[There is] little evidence in the record of efforts made by the state 
to help [mother] herself straighten out her emotional problems and 
find employment. Apparently Health and Welfare's only positive 
actions were to give her the very psychological tests which would 
later be used as evidence against her in the child forfeiture proceed- 
ing. 
Journal ofthe Association for Research on Mothering 1 79 
Michelle Hughes Miller 
Overall, the subtext of court decisions relies upon an assumption of experts 
actively and effectively performing their respective duties. Generally, the court 
presumed the integrity and commitment ofthe experts hired to ensure the "best 
interests" of the children in the court. In doing so, they reinforced both the 
validity of the opinions expressed by these experts and the externality of the 
mother's perspective and experience to the court proceedings. 
Perception 2: experts as the ''hzle" child advocates 
The tendency of the court to place the advocacy of "outsiders" in higher 
esteem than the advocacy of insiders (read mothers), may rest upon values of 
neutrality and objectivitywhich, for obvious reasons, mothers are perceived not 
to have. Nevertheless, such claims are also a not-so-subtle denigration of 
mother's perspective, grounded as it is in her lived experience. For instance, in 
I n  re the Marriage ofKleist and Mendez, the parents were arguing over custody. 
In deciding, the court turned to a court-appointed expert for her opinion about 
the best placement. The expert claimed that her recommendation was based 
upon a strategy whereby she sought a decision "that is fairer for the child than 
it is for either of the parents." In other words, the expert ignored the parents' 
claims ofknowledge about their child's best interests. Notice that this negation 
of expertise is true for both parents, including the one that the expert 
recommended for custody (in this case, the mother). Hence, the court, in 
accepting the expert's strategy and her recommendation, endorsed the expert's 
role as the "true" child advocate and silenced the mother's and father's voices 
in the process. 
While Kleist involves custody, this issue is more poignant for parental 
termination, where the adversarial expert voice has little or no experiential 
involvement with the child. This fungible expert enjoys an assumption of 
knowledge because of herlhis universalistic experience with mothers and 
children, while the mother's particularistic knowledge of her child is negated. 
Perception 3: experts as prescient beings 
Courts sometimes presume that experts hold unique prescient capabilities 
about mothers. This presumption is important because judges must make 
decisions that rest upon their ability to predict the "best" outcome. Indeed, the 
appellate court in Young D. Young chastised the trial court for its apparent 
disregard ofthe testimony of a court-appointed psychiatrist, a law guardian (the 
court-appointed child advocate), three pediatricians, caseworkers, and an 
expert hired by the mother (qualifications unspecified), noting that it behooves 
courts to give significant weight to the conclusions drawn by credible, neutral 
witnesses, or to justify themselves when they ignore such experts' recommen- 
dations. Reliance, therefore, upon experts who have been granted expertise 
partly because of their willingness to make predictions about the future 
behaviors of mothers is seen as appropriate. Yet the willingness to predict itself 
is controversial; some mental health practitioners argue experts must never 
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decide the outcome of facts (by predicting the future) but instead they should 
solely testify to the accuracy and objectivity of facts (Wolfe, 2003: 344). 
The goal of expert testimony in In re Interest fD.L.S. v. J.S.C., was to 
diagnose the mother's failures and outline her ~otential for recovery. The State 
had petitioned for the termination of mother's parental rights noting, interalia, 
that the mother was incapable of proper parenting "because of mental illness or 
mental deficiency" which they believed would "continue for a prolonged 
indeterminate period." Two psychologists testified that the mother had a 
"dependent personality disorder" characterized by an inability to "make deci- 
sions on her own." They predicted a lengthy recovery process. Using this 
information, the majority court terminated the mother's rights, arguing "[wle 
cannot gamble away an additional two years of this child's life on the speculative 
hope that the mother can overcome the deficiencywhich she, albeit through no 
fault ofher own, brought to motherhood." D.L.S. demonstrates how important 
this prescient ability is. By predicting a long recovery the experts presented to 
the court the image of a child kept perpetually in foster care. Despite the court's 
recognition ofthe mother's lackofblame for her condition (ironically reflecting 
her inability to make good decisions herself), this image dominated their 
decision. 
Family law decisions sometimes involve contrasting different conclusions 
drawn by individuals with similar qualifications. For instance, in In re Stephanie 
two social service agency caseworkers, two psychiatrists, a psychiatric nurse, a 
clinical psychologist and a neuropsychologist testified regarding the termina- 
tion of a mother's parental rights in her infant daughter. While the mother's 
mental health diagnosis varied depending upon the expert, at issue was the 
mother's ability to care for her child in the future. The neuropsychologist 
claimed that the mother's ailment was temporary and "improvement could well 
become realized within a four to six week treatment period." The other experts 
predicted a long, potentially fruitless treatment. Both the trial and the appellate 
courts terminated the mother's parental rights immediately, rejecting the need 
to take more time to assess the long- term prognosis (and failure) of the mother. 
In general, courts deferred to experts' predictions generated from their 
diagnoses of mothers' mental illness, intelligence, failure with previous chil- 
dren, inability to meet the experts' recommendations, or a perceived unwilling- 
ness to try to improve mothering behaviors. What all of these issues have in 
common is the willingness ofthe experts to presume knowledge of future events 
based upon present circumstances. Interestingly, a survey of research on the 
accuracy of mental health experts' predictions of clients' behaviors conducted 
by David Faust and Jay Ziskin (1988: 34) suggested that professionals were no 
more accurate in their predictions than laypersons. Nevertheless, the confi- 
dence by which mental health experts expressed their opinions led to judicial 
and jury bias, in that both entities were prejudiced toward the conclusions 
drawn by credentialed experts despite their relative inaccuracy and their 
incredible cost (Faust and Ziskin, 1988: 35). In otherwords, because judges and 
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juries engendered experts with expertise, their predictions were endowed with 
greater validity than research would warrant. 
Conclusion 
Ifwe allow for the recognition that an ideology ofmotherhood exists in the 
United States' system of justice, the question becomes: What role do experts 
play in supporting this ideology? Experts contribute in a number ofways to the 
judicial decision-making process, yet their role in defining and evaluating 
mothers is complicated. In general, expertise is granted only to those perceived 
credible by the courts. This certification process involves embodying experts 
with three expertise-affirming perceptions: 1) that experts are hard-working 
and blameless for the failures of mothers; 2) that experts are the "true" child 
advocates; and 3) that experts can accurately predict the future of mothers. Each 
of these perceptions serves to further endorse the voices and claims of experts 
in the courtroom. As Peter Schuck states: "...scientific facts are not immanent 
in an objective reditywaiting to be discovered by any scientists who look in the 
right place. Instead, they are constructed and validated through a social process 
dominated by those in the scientific communitywho possess authority to do so" 
(1993: 15). Through this social construction, the voices and experiential 
knowledge of mothers is devalued and their perceived adversarial positions are 
negated. 
In this paper I have considered the establishment of expertise in U.S. 
family law. I have argued that courts rely upon expert testimony in making 
decisions about mothers and, in doing so, often rely upon myths about 
motherhood that have little relationship to the lived experiences of mothers. By 
finding their voices silenced in comparison to the voices ofexperts, mothers can 
do little to shatter these myths or to claim their own knowledge about 
motherhood. The outcome is mothers as non-experts and a reinforcement of 
the ideology of motherhood. 
Addressing the restrictions on mothers' voices and expertise in family law 
decisions is complicated, as the silencing occurs within an adversarial, male- 
dominated system of law that is able to invoke-by s t a t u t e a  paternalistic 
relationship to its charges. And, existing experts may be complicit in the 
process; Sol Gothard (1989: 65), for instance, urges social workers to strive for 
expert status in the courtroom, because doing so enhances the prestige of the 
field of social work. In short, transforming perceptions of mothers' expertise 
may require a shift in power relations, between mothers andjudges and between 
mothers and those who evaluate them. As Laureen Snider (1994: 97) notes: 
Laws have the potential to be interpreted in ways which hurt women 
because women lack thepower to resist such interpretations (emphasis in 
original). 
At a minimum, this shift could involve acknowledging the bias endemic 
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to all expert testimony. This would serve to make obvious in the courtroom that 
which researchers have argued for a long time: that knowledge is subjective. 
Within this framework, the lived expertise of mothers could be interpreted as 
no less valid than-although distinctive from-the learned expertise of psy- 
chologists. I t  is also important to reject the adversarial structure of the judicial 
decision-making process that puts mothers, perhaps for the first time, outside 
the circle of concern for her children. In a court system that so often presumes 
mothers' and children's interests to be aligned (as in the issue of chiid support), 
it is ironic that mothers in family law cases are sometimes presumed to be 
arguing in direct opposition to the "best interests" of their children. Avoiding 
competitive claims of "true advocacy" by acknowledging all perspectives in the 
decision-making process would further reduce the impact of these decisions on 
mothers. 
whiie the transformation of the judicial decision-making process 
may improve the status of mothers in the court, it is important to recognize that 
structural inequities outside of the justice system continue to affect mothers7 
lived realities andwill continue to enter into the court decision-making process. 
The power differentials within the courtroom are therefore reflective of power 
differentials in the greater society and, as such, may not easily be reduced. 
Aversion of thispaper waspresentedat theAnnualMeeting of theAmerican Society 
of Criminology, Atlanta, M, November 2001. 
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